





This article is based on a study of actual U.S.-Chinal commercial con-
tracts. The contracts included those already in the files of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce and those submitted by U.S. companies in re-
sponse to a specific request by the Department for contracts to be used
in the preparation of this article. 2
The bulk of China's foreign trade is still carried out by specialized
foreign trade corporations (FTCs) subordinate to the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), 3 although ministerial
trade corporations (directly subordinate to particular industrial ministries)
and other Chinese units, such as provincial trade organizations and even
individual enterprises, are now playing a larger role in foreign trade.
Because of the greater number and therefore greater availability of FTC
contracts, the study concentrated on such contracts, although a number
of non-FTC contracts were also analyzed. 4 Whereas FTC contracts tend
*Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handier, Beijing.
**Regional Director for Asia, U.S. Trade and Development Program, Washington, D.C.
I. This article will use the terms China and the PRC interchangeably in describing the
People's Republic of China.
2. The request was contained in a February 1984 letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Commerce Eugene K. Lawson to approximately one hundred U.S. firms doing business
in China. The contract study underlying this article was undertaken by the authors while
they served on Deputy Assistant Secretary Lawson's staff at the Commerce Department.
However, the views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not
necessarily reflect U.S. government policy.
3. In mid-1985 there were about fifteen such FTCs.
4. The total number of contracts analyzed in this study was sixty-four, forty-six of which
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to be similar in many respects, often based on the same format, 5 non-
FTC contracts reveal a greater variety in format and content. This is not
surprising, since the non-FTC contracts involve Chinese organizations
relatively inexperienced in foreign trade, with no "standard forms" to
rely upon in drafting contracts. 6 Because of the relatively limited number
of such contracts in this study, it is more difficult to generalize about
these contracts than about FTC contracts. For this reason, this article
will concentrate on FTC contracts, with special reference to non-FTC
contract practices where appropriate.
This article is organized as a clause-by-clause analysis of some provi-
sions commonly found in contracts for the sale of U.S. equipment and
the licensing of U.S. technology to the PRC. 7 While many provisions in
contracts for Chinese exports are similar or at least analogous, we have
not included an analysis of Chinese export contract provisions in this
article.
It should be kept in mind that China's foreign trade system continues
to undergo change 8 and contract practices may also be expected to evolve
over time. As the Chinese learn more about Western legal systems and
commercial practices they may become more comfortable with contract
language that is now unacceptable to them.
!!. FrC Form Contracts
Chinese FTCs prefer to conduct business on the basis of standard form
contracts developed over a period of years. Most FTCs have a variety of
purchase form contracts, each for a different kind of transaction. The
forms range from a simple two-page contract for the purchase of an in-
dividual piece of equipment or a commodity to a complex document for
construction in China of a "turnkey" plant, including licensing of the
technology to be employed in the plant. The provisions of all of these
form contracts cover only the basic commercial terms of the transaction.
Often extensive appendices cover such matters as technical specifications
of the equipment being purchased, its installation in China and the training
of Chinese personnel.
were FTC contracts and eighteen of which were non-FTC contracts. While the Department
of Commerce does have on file and available for public inspection some of these contracts,
many others were provided to the Department on the condition that they not be made public.
5. See FTC Form Contracts, infra.
6. However, some ministerial trade corporations and other non-FTC units have, in the
absence of their own form contracts, adopted traditional FTC form contracts.
7. Thirteen of the contracts analyzed in this study were license agreements.
8. In late 1984, China announced a reform of its foreign trade system, under which, inter
alia, the FTCs will be given greater autonomy. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Daily Report, 15 November, 1984, at K 13-14.
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While the forms used by the various FTCs are not identical, they are
roughly similar in approach. Interestingly, Chinese form contracts are
quite similar to those used by Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations, 9 which
is not surprising since the PRC originally modeled its foreign trade system
after that of the Soviet Union. In some respects, Chinese form contracts
also parallel the General Conditions of Delivery in effect between the
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.10 The General Conditions
are meant to govern all Sino-Soviet commercial contracts, although their
provisions may be varied by agreement of the parties."
Chinese FTCs almost always offer their standard form contracts when
negotiations with Western companies reach the commercial stage.' 2 The
extent to which the Chinese negotiators are willing to modify the provi-
sions of the standard form contract depends on the particular FTC, the
nature of the transaction, the relative competitive position of the parties
and other factors. The great majority of U.S.-China contracts are struc-
turally based on the form contract of the FTC involved. Nonetheless,
departures from some of the language in those forms are frequently ob-
tained by U.S. firms during contract negotiations. This article describes
certain typical clauses in an FTC purchase form contract and indicates
where the departures most commonly occur and what terms are substituted.
A. PRICE
Normally the price is the subject of a separate section of an FTC's form
contract and, for the purchase of equipment, is negotiated on an F.O.B. 13
basis, usually F.O.B. at a specified U.S. port. Occasionally, C.1.F. or
C. & F. 14 are used as a basis for price calculation, most often when goods
are to be airshipped to China. 15 Evidently the Chinese motive in buying
9. For an analysis of Soviet FTO form contracts, see Hoya & Stein, Drafting Contracts
in U.S.-Soviet Trade, 7 LAW & POL. INT'L. Bus. 1057 (1975).
10. For a detailed description of the General Conditions, see Lebedoff, The People's
Republic of China Purchase Contracts with the Soviet Union and with Nonsocialist Coun-
tries, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 645 (1980).
11. It is not clear the extent to which the General Conditions are currently in use in Sino-
Soviet trade.
12. Negotiations are generally divided into two phases, technical and commercial. The
commercial phase, during which contract negotiations actually take place, does not begin
until the technical phase is completed.
13. F.O.B. stands for "free on board," and in the price context generally means that the
seller is responsible for the cost of delivering the goods on board a ship in a specified port,
normally in the seller's country.
14. C.I.F. stands for "cost, insurance, freight," while C. & F. stands for "cost and freight."
Under these price terms, the seller is responsible for the cost of delivery and insurance
(C.I.F.) or delivery alone (C. & F.) to a specified destination, normally in the buyer's country.
15. License agreements normally call for air shipment of technical documentation on a
C.I.F. basis to a specified Chinese airport.
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F.O.B. from the U.S. is to conserve hard currency by giving the insurance
and shipping business to Chinese operations.16
In many forms and many negotiated contracts, the price is expressly
stated to include such costs as those for spare parts, packing and loading.
In some cases, the specific cost for inland freight (included in the F.O.B.
price calculation) is broken out as a separate line item. F.O.B., C.I.F. and
C. & F. are, of course, delivery terms as well as price terms. Their func-
tion as delivery terms will be discussed in this article under Shipment,
infra.
Today's inflationary expectations often cause U.S. sellers to ask for
price escalation clauses in contracts with Chinese buyers, especially where
delivery is to be carried out over an extended period of time. Many FTC
forms and negotiated contracts, however, specifically state that all prices
are "firm,"' 17 and we are not aware of any recent U.S.-China equipment
contracts or license agreements that contain an escalation clause. 18 The
Chinese, however, have been willing to accept cost-plus clauses in en-
gineering and other service contracts, the effect of which is to allow price
escalation.
B. PACKING
The packing clause in FTC purchase form contracts generally calls for
the seller to meet certain standards for packing, either by specifying the
type of packing (e.g., "strong wooden cases ... suitable for long distance
ocean transportation...") or by a general reference (e.g., "in accordance
with normal commercial practice for this type of product..."). The seller
is then typically made liable for damage to the goods and expenses in-
curred because of improper packing. Some U.S. sellers have been able
to negotiate additional language which obligates the FTC purchaser to
clear the goods through Chinese customs and deliver them to their final
destination as quickly as possible. Such language may help minimize the
long delays in Chinese ports and elsewhere within China that could lead
to added hazard to the imported goods.
License agreements calling for the shipment of technical documenta-
tion, as opposed to equipment, frequently do not contain a separate pack-
16. Insurance is handled by the People's Insurance Company of China and shipping is
within the purview of the China National Chartering Corporation (chartering agents) and
the China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corporation (ocean shipment).
17. Although the same provision appears in contracts for the sale of Chinese goods, on
occasion Chinese sellers have attempted to unilaterally raise prices.
18. However, some license agreements calculate royalties as a percentage of the U.S.
list price of the licensed product, which indirectly permits an escalation effect, i.e., if the
list price rises then the royalty also rises.
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ing clause. Instead, they have a broader clause dealing with delivery of
technical documentation that includes packing, marking and shipment
provisions. This clause will be discussed under Shipment, infra.
C. SHIPPING MARKS
This FTC form contract clause, which is sometimes combined with the
packing clause, provides instructions for marking goods destined for the
PRC. Markings that are to appear on crates and other packages include,
inter alia, weight, dimensions, contract number, ports of destination and
other items, such as specific handling instructions (Right Side Up, Handle
with Care and Keep Dry). These provisions are self-explanatory and non-
controversial, and are not normally subject to any negotiation.
D. PAYMENT
Chinese purchase form contracts generally call for payment by the FTC
by means of irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) opened through the Bank
of China, China's foreign trade bank. An advising bank in the U.S. 19 that
has a correspondent relationship with the Bank of China 20 is often spec-
ified. 2 1 Many purchase form contracts call for a single payment covering
the full value of the contract, which is to be made against specified doc-
umentation after the goods have been shipped from the U.S. More com-
plex payment schemes involving advance (down) payments are found in
other purchase form contracts, in many negotiated contracts and in license
agreements, and are discussed further, infra.
The simplest type of form contract payment clause requires the FTC
to open an L/C fifteen to twenty days prior to the "date of delivery" or
"date of shipment." Although "date of delivery" is not specifically de-
fined, it is clear that in an F.O.B. context it refers to the date of scheduled
delivery of the goods to the port. The specific deadline for opening the
L/C is negotiable, although it rarely is earlier than forty-five days prior
to the date of delivery.
According to FTC form contracts, payment is to be made by the opening
bank (the Bank of China), after receipt by it of a sight draft and the required
documentation. Most negotiated contracts obligate the Bank of China to
make payment within a specified period (usually twenty to thirty days)
after receipt of the draft and documentation. Another provision of the
form contract payment clause states that the L/C is to remain valid for
19. Sometimes the term "negotiating bank" is used rather than "advising bank."
20. At present close to one hundred U.S. banks have such correspondent relationships.
21. In a number of recent contracts, the New York City branch of the Bank of China has
been specified as advising bank.
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fifteen days after the shipment takes place. This provision is often modified
to thirty or more days to allow for any delay in delivering the documen-
tation to the Bank of China.
The documentation required for payment generally includes: (I) bills
of lading or air waybills; (2) invoices; (3) packing lists; (4) manufacturer's
quality and quantity certificates; and (5) a copy of a cable notifying the
FTC of shipment. 22 Since bills of lading or air waybills are issued only
after the goods are loaded on board the ship or airplane, there is likely
to be an interval of several weeks when the seller has lost control of the
goods and the documents. However, the Bank of China has been fairly
reliable in making timely payment on the FTCs' contractual obligations,
and this theoretical risk has not proven to be a major problem in practice.
The remaining documentation items generally are within the control of
the seller. It should be noted that there is no set form for the manufac-
turer's quality and quantity certificates, and that any language reiterating
that the goods meet the contractual quality and quantity standards and
guarantees is acceptable.
As suggested above, payment schemes calling for a number of separate
payments are not uncommon in equipment purchase contracts. Most often
these involve a combination of down payments, payments tied to delivery
and performance hold-backs. In our study down payments ranged from 5
to 15 percent of the contract price, and were usually payable within thirty
days after signature of the contract. Documents required for payment in-
cluded invoices, drafts, copies of export licenses and letters of guarantee
or standby L/Cs issued by a Western bank to the buyer in the amount of the
down payment. Letters of guarantee and standby L/Cs are meant to protect
the Chinese buyer from the seller's failure to carry out the contract.
Contractual performance hold-backs are most common in turnkey plant
contracts, but are also found in some contracts for complete production
lines. The hold-back, typically 5-10 percent of the contract price, serves
as a kind of performance bond to ensure the seller's compliance with his
contractual commitments, tied as it usually is to the guarantee period (i.e.,
the hold-back amount is paid when the guarantee period has expired) or
to the completion of specified acceptance tests.
Payment schemes in license agreements tend to be more complex than
those in equipment contracts. Throughout much of the 1970s, the Chinese
preferred to pay for technology licenses strictly on the basis of a lump
sum, although actual payments were tied to specific events, e.g., contract
22. It is not always clear whether "shipment" in this context means completion of loading
of the goods on board the ship or actual departure of the ship. Some form contracts contain
a cross-reference to the Shipping Advice clause, which provides for notification to the buyer
when the goods are loaded on board rather than when the ship departs.
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signature, delivery of documentation, etc. In the last several years, how-
ever, the use of royalties has become common, and current license agree-
ments often combine lump sum disclosure fees (usually described as initial
fees) with royalties. In fact, some form license agreements used by Chinese
FTCs have been redrafted to include a mixed payment scheme.
License agreements with a mixed payment scheme typically call for a
small down payment (in the range of 10-20 percent of the initial fee), one
or more payments (totaling 30-45 percent) tied to the delivery of technical
documentation, one or more payments (totaling 15-35 percent) tied to
training or exchanges of technical visits by the licensor and licensee, one
or more payments (usually amounting to 10 percent) tied to completion
of acceptance tests or actual production of the licensed product plus a
per unit royalty based on some percentage of the "selling price" 23 of the
licensed product. The selling price is often defined as the licensor's list
price for the product in the U.S. and the royalty payment is calculated
by multiplying the unit royalty by the number of units produced or sold
by the licensee during the accounting period (three, six, or twelve months).
License agreements with only lump sum payments have the same basic
payment scheme minus the royalty.
Documentation needed for payment in license agreements is similar to
that called for in equipment purchase contracts. There are some docu-
ments, such as the acceptance test certificate, that are unique to the license
agreement, but for the most part they are self-explanatory.
E. SHIPMENT
The shipment clause of a typical FTC form contract sets forth details
on notification of and arrangements for physical shipment of the equip-
ment. It clarifies the meaning of the F.O.B., C. & F. or C.I.F. delivery
terms by spelling out the division of expenses and risk between the buyer
and seller.24
In the case of contracts calling for F.O.B. delivery at a named U.S.
port,25 the seller is obliged to advise the buyer, by a specified date, of
readiness of the goods for shipment from that port. Form contracts typ-
ically call for notification to the buyer from thirty to sixty days before
the specific date or month of shipment stipulated in the contract. This
23. The percentage is negotiable, and is generally in the range of 5 to 10 percent of the
selling price.
24. This is important because of differences between the existing various national and
international definitions of such delivery terms.
25. Short form (two-page) contracts, often used for simple purchases, typically contain
both F.O.B. and C. & F. provisions, one of which is deleted during negotiations. Most often
it is the C. & F. provision that is deleted.
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would in most cases be before the goods have left the seller's plant for
shipment to the port.
The seller must provide information on the size, weight and expected
date of readiness for shipment from the port so that the buyer can arrange
appropriate shipping space. The actual booking of shipping space is the
responsibility of a Chinese organization, the China National Chartering
Corporation (Sinochart). Sinochart or its local agent then must contact
the seller 10-20 days (the period varies from contract to contract) in ad-
vance of the scheduled date of arrival of the ship in the port so that final
shipping arrangements can be made.
Most FTC contracts provide that if the ship is delayed in its arrival by
more than thirty days beyond the arrival date set by Sinochart, the buyer
must bear the cost of storage and insurance. Presumably these costs are
borne by the seller for the first thirty days of delay. This is a potential ad-
ditional expense that the seller should keep in mind when negotiating the
contract. The seller also should be aware that FTC contracts typically make
the seller liable for dead freight or demurrage charges if the goods are not
ready for shipment on the specified date of arrival of the ship in port.
As mentioned above, the FTC form contract shipment clause usually
provides a definition of the actual shipping terms by detailing the respec-
tive rights and obligations of the seller and buyer.26 In the case of most
F.O.B. contracts, the seller bears all expenses and the risk of loss until
the goods pass over the ship's rail and are released from the tackle while
being loaded on board the ship.2 7 However, some contracts use the lan-
guage that risk of loss passes when "the goods have been properly loaded
on board," which may be a later point in time, i.e., when the goods have
actually been stowed in the hold of the ship.
FTC short form contracts have as an alternative to the F.O.B. clause
a C. & F. clause for both marine and air shipment. This clause makes
clear that the goods are to be delivered to the designated port or airport
in China at the seller's expense. Strangely, the C. & F. form contract
alternative does not mention risk of loss, 28 although it does contain a
notification of shipment provision similar to that found in the F.O.B.
alternative.
License agreements generally call for shipment of technical documen-
tation by air. The shipment, packing and marking provisions are normally
26. A few FTC forms, however, do not provide such a definition and in such cases it is
unclear who is to bear which expenses and when the risk of loss passes.
27. By way of contrast, under the International Chamber of Commerce "Incoterms"
definition of F.O.B., risk passes when the goods pass the ship's rail, before they are released
from the tackle.
28. Most definitions of C. & F. used internationally provide for risk of loss to pass when
the goods pass over the rail while being loaded on board the carrying vessel or airplane.
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included in a single contract clause dealing with delivery of technical
documentation, which also contains several related provisions.
The typical license agreement clause calls for delivery of technical
documentation C.I.F. at a named Chinese airport. The seller is to notify
the buyer by telex or cable within forty-eight hours after dispatch of the
documentation and to send by airmail the appropriate shipping documents,
including copies of the air waybill and packing list. Detailed packing
requirements are specified, as are marking details. Often, this technical
documentation delivery clause also specifies that the technical documen-
tation is to be in English and that the English measurement system is to
be used. Virtually all license agreements require the seller to replace
incomplete or damaged documentation within a given period, usually thirty
to sixty days after written notice of the deficiency.
In considering all these shipment and delivery provisions, a seller should
keep in mind that, as discussed above, a bill of lading (B/L) or air waybill
is a required document for payment under Chinese contracts. This means
that if the designated ship (or aircraft) is delayed in reaching the port (or
airport) or if shipment is delayed for other reasons (such as dock or airport
strikes), the seller will be unable to get payment for his goods. This is
true even if such a contract obliges the buyer to pay for storage costs
after thirty days of delay. To handle such situations, it would be useful
to have a clause that allows the seller in such cases of delay to turn the
goods over to a dockside or airport warehouse and receive a warehouse
or dock receipt which could substitute for the B/L or air waybill as a
payment document. This could also constitute effective delivery for pur-
poses of transfer of risk of loss. Our study did not turn up any U.S.-China
contracts containing such a clause, but such a solution is commonly used
in other parts of the world.
F. SHIPPING ADVICE
FTC equipment contracts generally contain a separate clause outlining
the seller's responsibility to advise the buyer of the completion of loading
of the goods on board the ship. The information that must be provided
includes the contract number, description of goods, weight, volume, price
and name of vessel. This is a pro forma provision which is not normally
subject to negotiation.
G. GUARANTEES
FTC equipment form contracts typically provide, in a separate section,
a set of rigorous guarantees for the goods being sold. There are different
types of guarantees, and their terms vary, depending on the type of goods
involved. In general, there is a guarantee of the quality of workmanship,
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materials and equipment, a guarantee of performance or production and
a guarantee of normal operation for a stated period. In practice, the pro-
visions on quality have not proven especially troublesome, but the other
types of guarantees sometimes have.
Certain language dealing with quality tends to occur commonly in FTC
form contracts. Typical phrases are that the goods are "made of the best
materials" with "first class workmanship" and that they "comply in all
respects with the quality and specification stipulated in the contract."
These provisions vary little from contract to contract, and do not appear
to have caused problems in practice for U.S. companies. License agree-
ments often contain guarantees that go even further in stating that the
supplied technology (in the form of technical documentation) is the "latest
technological achievement possessed by the seller" and is "exactly iden-
tical with the documentation the seller ... uses in the production of [the
same] products." We are unaware of any practical problems arising from
this particular formulation.
Almost all FTC equipment form contracts include a general guarantee of
normal operation of the equipment for a specified period of time. The time
period for this guarantee usually is in the range of twelve to eighteen months
from the date of arrival of the goods at the port (or airport) of destination or
a similar period after erection and commissioning of the equipment.
In practice, the guarantees sometimes demanded by FTCs with respect to
performance or production of equipment and technology have been a larger
source of difficulties than those discussed above. Such guarantees are not
found in FTC equipment form contracts, but are typically contained in
turnkey plant contracts and are found in some license agreements. In a
turnkey plant contract, for example, the seller may be obliged to guarantee
that the completed plant will produce a specific output using specified in-
puts. Similarly, a technology licensor may be forced to guarantee that the
technical documentation it supplies is sufficient to permit the licensee to
produce a product of the same quality as that produced by the licensor.
A key problem with such a guarantee is that Chinese operating con-
ditions and personnel are matters both beyond the seller's or licensor's
control and often quite different from those to which the seller or licensor
is accustomed. 29 Consequently, it may be hazardous for the seller or
licensor to guarantee a given level of performance or production.
United States companies often try to limit performance or production
guarantees so that they assume no responsibility for the effect of factors
29. A related problem is the combination of a broad guarantee clause with a generous
penalty clause (see Late Delivery and Penalty, below), which together create an incentive
to fail to produce to the guaranteed level.
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over which they have little or no control. 30 Obtaining such limitations
frequently entails hard bargaining with the FTC.
China's new Technology Contract Regulations require that the licensor
guarantee that "it is the legal owner of the technology supplied and fur-
thermore ...that the technology supplied is complete, without errors,
effective, and capable of achieving the goals stipulated in the contract." 3 1
Despite assurances from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade that these Regulations are only a starting point for negotiations, it
is likely that many Chinese organizations will insist on the verbatim in-
corporation of this language in license agreements, if only to simplify the
approval process. It is therefore doubly important for foreign firms to
define the licensed technology and output goals extremely carefully. Such
drafting must tread a fine line between marketing considerations and po-
tential breach of contract liability.
Procedures for claiming breach of guarantee in equipment contracts are
sometimes included in the guarantee clause and are at other times the
subject of a separate "claims" clause. Basically, the buyer has the right
to make a claim for breach at any time during the guarantee period. Such
a claim, according to FTC form contracts, is to be supported by an in-
spection certificate issued by the China Commodity Inspection Bureau
(CCIB). Negotiated contracts sometimes make no reference to CCIB, but
do require the buyer to arrange a "survey" and provide a survey report
in support of its claim. License agreements normally do not specify pro-
cedures in cases of breach of guarantee.
If equipment covered by a guarantee proves defective, the basic remedy
under FTC form contracts is repair or replacement by the seller or re-
duction in the price of the goods (although the latter remedy is sometimes
deleted from negotiated contracts). Most contracts do not spell out the
conditions under which each of these remedies is to apply, nor do they
specify how a price reduction is to be calculated in cases where that
remedy is applied. Many FTC form contracts also give the buyer the
option of "eliminating the defect" himself at the seller's expense. Some
negotiated contracts add language that requires the seller's consent before
the buyer can take such action.
Turnkey or complete production line contracts often provide a specific
remedy for failure to meet production output guarantees or related input
30. For example, a licensor may wish to guarantee only that the technical documentation
it is supplying is sufficient to enable the licensee to produce the licensed product if inputs,
including conditions of the work site, are of the same character and quality as those utilized
by the licensor and the labor force is of the same level of skill as that of the licensor.
31. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Management of Contracts for
the Introduction of Technology (promulgated by the State Council and effective May 24,
1985) [hereinafter cited as Technology Contract Regulations] Art. 6.
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guarantees (raw materials and energy consumption). The most typical
clause calls for monetary penalties based on the degree of nonfulfillment
of these guarantees (e.g., if production output is only 98 percent of that
guaranteed, a penalty of .4 percent of the contract price is applied; if 96
percent, a penalty of .8 percent, etc.). The contract usually sets a max-
imum amount for penalties, in the range of 5 percent of the contract price.
Some license agreements have similar provisions.
As mentioned above in the Payment section, one method used in equip-
ment contracts to ensure that the seller carries out his guarantee obliga-
tions is to provide a holdback of a portion of the contract price until the
guarantees are satisfied. An alternative sometimes used is a bank guar-
antee or standby L/C for a percentage of the contract value that assures
the buyer that damages for breach of guarantee will be paid. Thus the
seller obtains the full purchase price upon delivery of the goods at the
cost of having to furnish the bank guarantee or L/C.
H. LATE DELIVERY AND PENALTY
A crucial part of every FTC equipment form contract is the section
specifying the buyer's remedies in the event of a delay in delivery by the
seller. The basic remedies are a penalty based on the length of the delay
and, after a stipulated period of delay, cancellation of the contract. Nor-
mally these remedies are set forth in a separate section of the contract
entitled "Late Delivery and Penalty."
The basic penalty provision usually stipulates a penalty for delay in
delivery of equipment at rates that are a percentage, typically .5 percent,
of the "value" of the delayed goods per week of delay. Presumably value
in this context means contract price. In some but by no means all cases,
an accompanying clause limits the extent of the penalty to 5 percent of
the value of the delayed goods.
The penalized delay period generally ranges between ten weeks and
three months from the date of scheduled delivery. Complete plant con-
tracts generally have a different provision with a longer time period
which calls for consultation between the parties if the delay seriously
affects construction of the plant. This is understandable, since the buyer
is not likely to cancel such a contract, particularly if it has been partially
fulfilled.
It should be noted that the penalty rates mentioned above are subject
to negotiation and may vary depending on the length of the delay. Our
study included negotiated contracts, for example, that provided a penalty
of .25 percent per week for the first four weeks of delay, increasing to .5
percent per week for the second four weeks and I percent per week for
longer delays. The lowest penalty rate was . I percent per week. The
VOL. 20, NO. 3
U.S.-CHINA COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 909
penalty cap varied less than the penalty rate, although in some cases it
was less than the standard 5 percent. 3 2
License agreements often provide, in addition to a penalty for late
delivery of technical documentation (usually in the range of .05-. 1 percent
of the contract price), a penalty for delivery of incomplete or incorrect
documentation. The seller is typically given three weeks to dispatch the
additional or correct documentation, after which he becomes liable for a
penalty based on a percentage (in the range of .01-.08 percent per week)
of the total contract price of the documentation.
One may wonder why a penalty clause is used in Chinese contracts
rather than a remedy based on actual damages. One reason may be its
speed and simplicity of application; a penalty clause creates none of the
complex proof problems involved in ascertaining and establishing dam-
ages. 3 3 More fundamentally, however, Chinese FTCs use penalty clauses
in their purchase contracts not so much to obtain money quickly in the
event of delay, but rather to stimulate punctual performance by the seller.
Another issue that arises in connection with penalty clauses is the legal
enforceability of a penalty based on length of delay. The primary question
may be what law governs the contract. If U.S. law governs, there could
be a serious question regarding the validity of such a penalty clause if the
penalty does not bear a substantial relationship to damages foreseeable
at the time of contracting. The outcome could be different if Chinese or
a third country law governs. 34
I. FORCE MAJEURE
The typical FTC form contract has a clause relieving the seller of liability
for delays in shipment or non-delivery of goods due to force majeure.
The force majeure clause presents two major issues: (1) the determination
of circumstances that qualify as force majeure; and (2) the effect on the
parties' rights and obligations when such circumstances occur. An addi-
tional procedural issue is the notice provision contained in most FTC form
contracts.
The outstanding feature of most Chinese FTC form contract force ma-
jeure clauses is the absence of a definition of force majeure. The contracts
32. The cap in the contract with a .I percent per week penalty rate was, in fact, only I
percent.
33. However, the new Foreign Economic Contract Law provides that, where the con-
tractually specified penalty is "too high or too low for the loss caused ... either party may
appeal to an arbitration agency or a court of law for an appropriate reduction or increase."
Foreign Economic Contract Law (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Sixth People's
Congress, March 12, 1985; effective July 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Economic
Contract Law], Art. 20. How this provision will be interpreted remains to be seen.
34. For a discussion of choice-of-law, see Dispute Settlement, infra.
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that do define force majeure geneally limit it to war, fire, flood and earth-
quake. Some negotiated contracts add the language "and other causes
beyond the reasonable control of the party" or "other cases which can
be recognized by both parties as being cases for force majeure." 35
None of these formulations deals directly with the question of labor
disputes, which is of major concern to U.S. sellers. If no definition of
force majeure is included, presumably the governing law of the contract
determines whether labor disputes would be recognized as a force majeure
circumstance. 36 If the contract limits force majeure to specific natural
disasters or catastrophic events (fire, flood, earthquake), it is difficult to
see how a strike or other labor dispute could qualify as force majeure.
On the other hand, if the operative language is "causes beyond the
reasonable control of the party," a given labor dispute might qualify. For
example, a strike at an important supplier of the seller, or a lock-out at
an essential transportation facility arguably would be beyond the seller's
control. On the other hand, a strike at the seller's own plant might be
less clearly beyond his control since he presumably could end the strike
by reaching some accommodation with the workers. Similarly, language
which leaves it up to the parties to agree on what circumstances qualify
as force majeure creates uncertainty in predicting whether a given labor
dispute (or any other circumstance) may be used as an excuse for late or
nonperformance.
It should also be noted that most attempts by U.S. companies to get
Chinese agreement to a specific listing of labor disputes as a force majeure
circumstance have been unsuccessful. At the same time, Chinese nego-
tiators occasionally have told their American counterparts that transpor-
tation and other "third party" strikes beyond the seller's control would
indeed be recognized as force majeure in practice.
FTC form contracts generally provide that the seller is not to be held
responsible for delays caused by force majeure but also provide that the
seller remains under an obligation to "take all necessary measures" to
hasten delivery of the goods. It is not clear what the extent of this obli-
gation is. For instance, if the seller could "cover" by procuring the goods
delayed by force majeure at double the price, is he obligated to do so?
Few sellers would agree, but such language could be so interpreted.
A minority of FTC form contracts specifically state that the time for
performance by the seller of his contractual obligations is to be extended
35. Article 24 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 33, defines force majeure
as "an event that cannot be anticipated at the time of the signing of the contract by the
parties concerned, an event of which the occurrence and aftermath are neither avoidable
nor surmountable."
36. For a further discussion of governing law, see Arbitration, infra.
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by a period equal to the effect of the force majeure circumstances. Such
contracts do not contain the "necessary measures" language mentioned
above, and it is difficult to say whether the intent of the two types of
clauses is really different or if the end result is the same, i.e., that the
seller's obligation to perform remains in both cases, but that performance
deadlines are to be extended for a period equal to the force majeure period.
Virtually all FTC contracts provide that continuation of the force ma-
jeure for an extended period (usually one hundred twenty days or ten
weeks) gives the buyer the right to cancel the contract. However, there
is no accompanying provision spelling out the rights and obligations of
the parties in case of cancellation when the contract has already been
partially performed.
In addition to its main provisions, the force majeure clause in FTC
contracts and Article 25 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law both
impose a duty of notice on the seller who is unable to perform because
of force majeure. The seller is to advise the buyer "immediately" of the
force majeure circumstance and within 14 days must document the force
majeure with a certificate from the "competent government authorities"
or "relevant authorities." While it is not absolutely clear who the "com-
petent government authorities" or "relevant authorities" would be, they
could include local or national chambers of commerce. 37
J. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Despite the vast changes in the Chinese commercial and legal systems
in the last ten years, neither the contractual clauses governing dispute
settlement nor the practical reality of dispute resolution have shown the
drastic changes which might have been expected. The most commonly
used dispute resolution clause in FTC form contracts still provides for
"friendly consultations" as a preliminary step. In the event the dispute
persists, the parties are to resort to the Foreign Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (FETAC) 38 of the China Council for the Pro-
motion of International Trade. The FETAC's arbitration proceedings are
to be held in Beijing and its decision is final and binding, with no appeal.
Arbitration costs are chargeable to the losing party. The typical clause
also provides that arbitration may be held in a mutually agreeable third
country, but no such country is specified.
37. Certainly in China, chambers of commerce or such equivalents as the China Council
for the Promotion of International Trade, could be considered "'government authorities"
as well as "relevant authorities."
38. In 1980, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, which had been established in
1954, was renamed the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.
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In the last decade, other more detailed dispute settlement clauses have
appeared. The Chinese have agreed to arbitrate in third countries includ-
ing, inter alia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada. Another recent devel-
opment in this area is the presence in a small number of contracts of
provisions limiting the time between the start of "friendly consultations"
and resort to arbitration. Other than these changes, form contract dispute
settlement clauses remain fairly standardized.
While many U.S.-China contracts still call for arbitration in Beijing, a
growing number now specify Stockholm. These two locations accounted
for over ninety percent of the contracts in our study. Other contracts
provided for arbitration in the "country receiving the complaint" or the
country of "the accused party." The obvious problem with such clauses
is the temptation it provides for the parties to engage in gamesmanship
so as to ensure that the arbitration is in their home forum.
Surprisingly, not all contracts in our study specified the arbitration body
or the procedural rules which it would apply. Among those that did, all
but one of the contracts providing for arbitration in Sweden specified the
use of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and its rules. Those calling
for Beijing arbitration all specified use of FETAC, while the International
Chamber of Commerce 39 and the American Arbitration Association each
also received one mention.
Similarly, even fewer U.S.-China contracts specified the substantive
law to be applied by the arbitration body. Three contracts in our study
specifically allowed the arbitrators to choose the applicable law 4° and
another three contained a peculiar negative clause, which enjoined the
tribunal from application of United States or Chinese laws but did not
specify which law would be applied in their stead. Swedish, Swiss, or
other foreign law is infrequently selected in negotiated contracts. Several
contracts in our study provided that arbitration should proceed "according
to the principles of the contract" but those failed to name the law gov-
erning gap-filling or interpretation of the contract.
The Foreign Economic Contract Law permits the parties to seek dispute
settlement "in accordance with laws of their choosing," but provides that
if no governing law is specified, "the law of the country most closely
related to the contract shall apply." While the country "most closely
related to the contact" could often be the PRC, the law reassures foreign
investors to a certain extent by further providing that, if there are no
39. This may be an aberration or it may signify a change in policy, since in the past the
Chinese have refused to accept the ICC, which still includes Taiwan in its membership.
40. Under the procedural rules utilized in a given arbitration, the arbitrators may in any
case enjoy the power to select the governing law.
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"relevant stipulations in the laws of the PRC, international norms shall
apply." 4 '
Three contracts in our study designated English as the language of the
arbitration. None named Chinese, although the FETAC proceedings called
for by many of the contracts would, of course, be in Chinese. 42
All of the contracts termed the arbitral award "final and binding." Under
FETAC rules, there is no appeal from its award to "a court of law or any
other organization." 43 Although the FETAC rules provide for enforcement
of an award by a People's Court,44 it is not clear how this mechanism
works in practice.
K. TAX AND CUSTOMs TREATMENT
Chinese short form purchase contracts generally contain no provisions
detailing which party is responsible for payment of taxes and customs
duties incurred in connection with the performance of the contract. More
complex or long-term contracts, however, often specify tax and customs
treatment.
The tax and customs treatment provisions apportion responsibility in
three basic ways: (1) according to the time of imposition of the tax or
customs duty; (2) according to the nation under whose laws the levy is
imposed; or (3) according to the place of performance of the contract.
The only example in our study of the use of time as a determinant was
in a purchase contract which was executed in conjunction with a licensing
agreement. It provided for the U.S. firm to pay all taxes and customs
duties assessed before delivery to the buyer; all duties assessed after
delivery were to be the buyer's responsibility. Such a clause, without
more, obviously raises the question of what constitutes "delivery" and
whether it is the same as delivery for purposes of payment.
The licensing agreement executed in tandem with that purchase con-
tract, interestingly, contained a totally different clause, providing for the
Chinese buyer to pay all taxes and duties "due under any law in effect
within the People's Republic of China." Conversely, the U.S. seller was
to pay taxes and duties arising under U.S. law. If either party was required
to make any such payments which, under the terms of the agreement,
should have been the responsibility of the other party, reimbursement was
required to put the parties in the same position contemplated by the
agreement.
41. Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 33, Art. 5.
42. Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Art. 36.
43. Id., Art. 31.
44. Id., Art. 32.
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More common and substantially clearer clauses were found in half a
dozen license agreements in our study. These clauses provided for pay-
ment by the Chinese licensee of all taxes levied by the Chinese government
and for payment of all taxes levied outside the PRC in connection with
the performance of the contract by the U.S. licensor, who also undertook
to pay the Chinese individual income tax for all U.S. technical personnel
on the project.45 Such clauses will no longer be approved, however, under
a recently publicized Ministry of Finance document prohibiting "the
method of coverage of taxes" and rendering all such clauses null and
void. 46
A tax-related clause found in only one contract in our study but which
is of broad applicability stated that the Chinese licensee would use its
best efforts to gain favorable tax treatment because of the high technology
being transferred and its "potential for export." This language derives
from Chinese tax regulations that allow for reduction of, or exemption
from, the withholding tax on technology transfer. Without such a clause
it may be hard to obtain the Chinese partner's cooperation, which is
essential in obtaining preferential tax treatment. This is particularly true
in the increasingly common situation of a contract concluded with a local
enterprise or organization which has little or no experience in foreign
business and in dealing with its own country's tax authorities.
L. TERM, EFFECTIVE DATE AND
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT
Chinese purchase form contracts do not provide for a specific contract
term and there is little need for such a provision in a typical one-shot
sales transaction. License agreements are another story, however, and
agreements reviewed in our study were for terms of from three to fifteen
years. The Technology Contract Regulations now limit the term of a li-
cense agreement to ten years or a time period commensurate with the
time "necessary to grasp the technology."
47
The effective date of many contracts is the date on which all necessary
approvals of both governments have been obtained. 48 The time period
45. Under current Chinese tax law, the licensor in most cases is liable for a 20 percent
withholding tax on the value of the transferred technology.
46. Ministry of Finance (82) Caishuizi (Document No. 102, Mar. 29, 1982). Despite the
1982 date, most Chinese organizations were apparently as unaware of this policy as their
foreign counterparts until late 1984.
47. Technology Contract Regulations, supra note 31, Art. 8.
48. Article 7 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 33, provides that contracts
requiring PRC government approval shall be effective as of the date of approval. Article 4
of the Technology Contract Regulations. supra note 3 1. goes one step further, providing not
only that contracts are effective as of the date of approval, but also stipulating that if a
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within which such approvals must be forthcoming to escape voiding the
contract ab initio varies from three to twelve months. Given current U.S.
export license processing time, three months would seem to be an ex-
tremely optimistic estimate for cases requiring validated export licenses.
The most comprehensive and practical effective date clause found in our
study coupled a time limit for obtaining government approvals with a
proviso that the limit could be extended by agreement of the parties.
A few license agreements provided for automatic extensions upon ter-
mination of the existing contract, while others provided for discussions
on extension at some specified time in the term. Very few contracts spec-
ified causes for termination other than expiration of the contract term and
almost as few spelled out the rights and duties of the parties upon ter-
mination. Those that did so provide generally specified that termination
would not affect debts, rights, or liabilities between the parties. Clauses
in such contracts required notice one to two months in advance of the
desired termination date. Causes for termination included "for conve-
nience" (this was a contract for custom designed equipment; the same
clause spelled out the method of compensation for such termination) and
for default in performance of the contract obligations, including bank-
ruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation of the parties. Given China's relative
inexperience in dealing with these latter three situations, such a clause is
a good precaution.
M. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY;
INDEMNIFICATION
Approximately 10 percent of the contracts in our study contained ex-
press limitation of liability provisions, and those that were included tended
to be broad and had been drafted by the U.S. party. Chinese FTC form
contracts do not include such a provision.
One equipment purchase contract in our study included a clause limiting
the seller's liability for any and all claims to an amount not to exceed the
contract price. The same clause exempted the U.S. firm from liability for
incidental or consequential damages (not including late-delivery penal-
ties), claims of the Chinese buyer's customers, or damages due to loss of
profits.
The license agreements in our study which contained limitation of li-
ability clauses also generally excluded liability for incidental or conse-
quential damages. The broadest of the clauses provided for indemnifi-
cation by each party for fines, penalties, losses, damages, costs, and
contract has been submitted for approval and no decision has been made within 60 days,
the contract then automatically becomes effective.
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expenses incurred by the other party "in connection with the business,"
as well as for failure to perform its contractual obligations. The U.S. firm
was also specifically not to be held liable for any damages to persons or
property arising from the use or failure of equipment furnished, leased,
or loaned to the Chinese party.
Some contracts in our study contained provisions meant to avoid sit-
uations out of which liability might arise. Examples were: provisions
exempting the U.S. firm from the responsibilities of translating technical
information into Chinese and converting measures and dimensions into
the metric system; careful definitions of "complete," "reliable," and "leg-
ible" documentation; and limitations on the time period within which
defective items would be corrected or replaced.
N. PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET,
AND KNow-How PROTECTION
The increasing prominence of license agreements in China business and
the value of the technology to both parties necessitate particularly careful
attention to patent, trademark, trade secret and know-how protection.
Chinese form contracts generally do not contain clauses on these subjects,
so their drafting falls to the foreign party.49 Aside from standard repre-
sentations as to the legal right of the U.S. firm to transfer the technology,
four types of considerations were reflected in the contracts in our study:
(1) nondisclosure or confidentiality requirements; (2) marketing restric-
tions; (3) rights of use and ownership of modifications or improvements;
and (4) liability for infringement actions brought by a third party. Few
contracts contained all four types of clauses, but most contained fairly
detailed nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions.
At the most fundamental level, the Chinese purchaser may acknowledge
that the U.S. firm's formulas, drawings, specifications, manufacturing
processes, products, customer lists, and price lists are trade secrets and
that such trade secrets and other proprietary information are to remain
the property of the U.S. firm and be kept secret during the contract term,
as well as after its termination. Careful drafting of this section will avoid
the ambiguous result of one license agreement in our survey in which the
Chinese party agreed to keep "secret and confidential know-how supplied
• . . during the validity period of the contract," making it unclear whether
the obligation to maintain secrecy extended beyond the contract term.
49. The Technology Contract Regulations, supra note 31, in Article 7, provide that con-
fidentiality of material not already made public shall be protected "according to the scope
and limits agreed upon by the parties."
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The Chinese have also accepted nondisclosure clauses requiring the
written consent of the U.S. licensor to any communication of proprietary
information to a third party. Such clauses generally exempt information
which has been published or otherwise become "generally known." Some
clauses balance the licensee's obligation to obtain confidentiality agree-
ments from those to whom proprietary data is disclosed with a reciprocal
obligation on the part of the licensor to maintain similar agreements with
its employees, subcontractors and others. A small number of agreements
in our study required that information provided within the last three or
five years of the contract term be kept confidential for an equivalent
number of years after receipt or that certain technical materials be re-
turned within a short period after termination of the contract. 50
Marketing restrictions are somewhat harder to obtain; no matter what
the subject technology may be, the Chinese are usually loath to give up
foreign marketing rights. Many U.S. companies surmount this obstacle
by granting some rights of use, manufacture, and sale in, for example,
Afghanistan, North Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Burma, and other countries
whose markets the firm does not anticipate penetrating. 51 One of the
agreements in our study granted the U.S. licensor no right to restrict use,
manufacture, or sale outside the PRC. However, the same result was
achieved by requiring consultations before the licensee undertook any
such actions. Other useful restrictions included one which prohibited sub-
licenses during the contract term and one which bound the Chinese party
to use its best efforts to investigate any unauthorized use of the technology
within the PRC and to seek any available remedies. The latter clause may
prove an effective warning device if proposed during negotiations with
Chinese organizations which might want or need to share the newly im-
ported technology. 52 While the Technology Contract Regulations prohibit
"unreasonable restrictions on the receiving party's sales channels or ex-
port markets," 53 Chinese officials have stated that "traditional markets"
of the foreign firm will be respected.
Marketing restriction clauses may also include provisions governing
use of the licensor's trademarks. Three of the license agreements in our
survey prohibited the use of the licensor's trademark entirely. They also
50. Such restrictions may no longer be possible in light of Article 9(8) of the Technology
Contract Regulations, supra note 31, which does not permit "prohibitions on the continued
use of the introduced technology by the receiving party after completion of the term."
51. However, licensors should be aware that United States export administration regu-
lations may prohibit the transfer of such rights to certain technology.
52. Increasing competition between Chinese enterprises probably makes it less likely that
domestic technology sharing poses a serious threat to foreign licensors.
53. Technology Contract Regulations, supra note 31, Art. 9(7).
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prohibited the use of any similar trademarks without the licensor's written
consent, allowing only the phrase "made under license from. .. ."
A number of license agreements in our study committed one or both
parties to provide the other with information on improvements on or
modifications to the technology made during the contract term. 54 Such
information was generally to be provided free of charge, but with varying
conditions. One U.S. firm made a commitment to furnish such information
only after having adopted an improvement in its own manufacturing pro-
cesses and having obtained satisfactory performance in the field for twelve
months. Another firm required improvements and modifications to be kept
secret and confidential for the contract term, although the need for such
a clause might depend on the agreement's definition of the original tech-
nology to be protected. Several license agreements specified that im-
provement or modification information would be furnished only with re-
spect to documentation previously provided. This is a wise precaution in
light of the Chinese understanding of "complete documentation ' 55 and
thirst for technology. Surprisingly, only one of the agreements in our study
addressed the issue of ownership of improvements or modifications, grant-
ing ownership to their developer; any patent application for, or attempt
to transfer, an improvement or modification then required the consent of
the owner.
Several U.S. firms assumed responsibility for all legal representation
and expenses in connection with any infringement actions brought by a
third party. One, however, agreed to share equally in the costs of such a
suit and payment of any damages only if the judgment was due solely to
manufacturing under the agreement and solely to use of the seller's tech-
nical information. Even this responsibility was conditioned on prompt
notice of the suit and the seller's having an option to participate in con-
trolling defense of the suit. This seller was obligated to use all reasonable
efforts to modify the supplied technology to overcome the infringement.
0. APPENDICES
There is no such thing as a "standard" contract appendix. This section
outlines the extent to which appendices may be used to fill the gaps in
the still-developing legal framework for business in and with China.
At the most fundamental level, appendices may contain specifications
and extensive descriptive lists of equipment and information to be pro-
vided. This is not as elementary a concern as it may at first glance appear,
54. The Technology Contract Regulations, supra note 31, permit such restrictions but
require that they be reciprocal (Art. 9(5)).
55. See Appendices, infra.
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given the Chinese understanding of "complete documentation." Without
carefully drafted specifications, in an appendix or elsewhere, a U.S. firm
may find itself confronted with seemingly endless demands for more in-
formation, much of which may be outside the scope of its technical or
legal power or ability to provide, or for still more copies of documentation
already provided at no increase in cost.
Similarly, appendices may be used to detail the number of technical
personnel to visit the U.S. for training or the number of U.S. personnel
to be provided to the project in China. In such cases, the technical qual-
ifications of the personnel should be included, as should the number,
duration, and purpose of visits, housing and transportation provisions and
arrangements for payment of costs. Generally, the U.S. firm pays for
transportation of its personnel to China and some portion of living ex-
penses there, while the Chinese side pays for local transportation and
provides certain services (e.g., laundry, interpreters). When Chinese come
to the U.S., similar provisions usually apply.
Equally common in appendices are specifications of acceptance test
procedures, a vital component of licensing agreements. 56 Few subjects
concerning the details of operation of a licensing or other venture would
be out of place in an appendix; the clearer the terms of the cooperation,
the less chance of misunderstandings, delays, and avoidable costs.
II. Conclusion
This article has attempted to outline current contractual practice for
sales and licensing to the People's Republic of China. Despite the vast
growth in U.S.-China trade and investment over the last decade, contract
provisions have changed much less than might be expected. However,
contractual practice is never static, and the provisions outlined here should
be regarded as starting points for negotiation. Further development is
likely to better meet the requirements of increasingly sophisticated
transactions.
56. See Late Delivery and Penalty, supra, for a discussion of penalties for failure to meet
acceptance tests.
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